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Abstract
We are living in a digital and information-driven age and need to store information related to virtually
every aspect of our lives, nuclear information included. For computer system to be reliable and secure in
nuclear facilities, unauthorized event changes must be prevented (which means maintaining confidentiality), field device inputs and outputs must remain immutable throughout their usable lifetime
(which means maintaining - integrity), and all component parts should remain in an operable state (which
means maintaining - availability).The dynamic and complex nature of cyber threats has made it a serious
challenge to secure computer systems in nuclear facilities. A number of varied cyber security services,
policies, mechanisms, strategies and regulatory frameworks have been adopted , including:
confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, encipherment, defense-in-depth (DID), design
basis threat (DBT), IAEA technical guidance documents such as: GS-R-1, GS-R-2, GS-R-3, GS-G-3.13.5, NSS20, NSS23-G, NSS13, NSS17, NST036, NST045, and NST047, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-2010,
NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-82, NEI 04-04, NEI 08-09 and country-specific requirements such as: 10
CFR 73.54, RG 5.71 (U.S.NRC), KINS/RG-N08.22 (South Korea). However, threats remain persistent.
This paper is aimed at providing a regulatory perspective on nuclear cyber security, its relationship to
nuclear safety and security, regulatory requirements and global best practice recommendations for nuclear
cyber security, and strategies to prevent and counteract threats. This study is imperative as Nigeria
prepares to join the league of countries with operational nuclear power plants and research reactors
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following approval and adoption of the nuclear power programme roadmap in 2007 and contract signing
with Rosatom of Russia for NPP and research reactor construction.
Keywords: Cyber security, nuclear security, nuclear power plants, critical digital assets

I.

Introduction, Motivation, Goals, Scope and
Methodology

Cyber security includes all processes and mechanisms by which any digital equipment, information or
service is protected from unintended or unauthorized access, change or destruction. As a component of
nuclear security and the design basis threat (DBT) [1], cyber security is the range of measures enacted to
prevent, detect, or respond to the theft of Category I nuclear material or to the sabotage of a nuclear
facility, which could result in catastrophic radiological consequences by either exploiting vulnerabilities
in information and computer systems alone or combined with physical attacks [2]. According to the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71, cyber-attack is
the manifestation of either physical or logical (i.e., electronic or digital) threats against computers,
communication systems, or networks that may originate from either inside or outside the licensee’s
facility, have internal and external components, involve physical or logical threats, be directed or nondirected in nature, be conducted by threat agents having either malicious or non-malicious intent and have
the potential to result in direct or indirect adverse effects or consequences to critical digital assets (CDAs)
or critical systems (CSs). This includes attempts to gain unauthorized access to a CDA and/or CS’s
services, resources, or information, the attempt to compromise a CDA and/or CSs Integrity, Availability,
or Confidentiality (C.I.A triad) or the attempt to cause an adverse impact to a Safety, Security and
Emergency Preparedness (SSEP) functions.
The increasing wave of digitization of systems and processes has necessitated the upgrade of analog
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) to digital I&C systems, i.e.
systems based on computers and microprocessors to monitor, operate, control, and protect those facilities.
Digital systems offer higher reliability, better plant performance and additional diagnostic capabilities.
Analog systems will gradually become obsolete in the general IT paradigm shift to digital I&C systems.
About 40% of the world's operating nuclear reactors have been modernized to include at least some
digital I&C systems. Most new NPPs incorporate digital I&C systems. Digital I&C systems have posed
new challenges for the nuclear industry and regulators, who are responsible for designing the methods,
data and experience to assure themselves that the new systems meet all reliability and performance
requirements. In general, countries that have more new builds have had greater incentives and
opportunities to develop the needed capabilities. Other countries are still in the process of doing so.
According to the 2018 Verizon DBIR report, more than 25% of cyber-attacks have been at the hands of
insiders who exploit their authorized access. Trusted employees, contractors, and business partners pose a
substantial risk to organizations. They often have the ability to bypass many security controls that focus
on keeping outsiders out and are not capable of viewing insider activity or are tuned to ignore actions by
authorized users. In the cloud, security teams have to understand the extent of these insider threats and
enforce appropriate cloud controls to detect unauthorized actions by insiders. The threat posed by cyberattacks often as a national and international security concern has grown in sophistication, frequency of
occurrence and scale over the years, as shown in Figure 3. The problem is complicated by the
involvement of nation states in these attacks as shown in Figure 4, attacks which had previously been the
exclusive domain of private hackers, script kiddies and organized criminal groups. Attacks restricted to
networks and financial computer systems have been extended to all IT and ICS components of nuclear
facilities with all the implications, risks and potential radiological consequences such attacks pose to
lives, property and the environment.
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The importance of this paper is underscored by the fact that nuclear security is tremendously impacted by
cyber security. Nuclear facilities made up of field devices, field controllers, supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) and instrumentation and control (I&C) systems as shown in Figure 1 are missioncritical infrastructure that are susceptible to attacks from Nation States and non-state actors like
hactivist/hactivism, third-parties, organized crime, professional criminals, spies, voyeurs, corporate
raiders, disgruntled insiders, vandals, script kiddies and cyber terrorists as shown in Table 1.1. The
various threat actors have different motivations, intentions for their activities, and capabilities, which adds
to the complexity of the problem and increases the need for comprehensive understanding of the risks at
regional, industry, institutional and process levels.
Table 1.1 Cyber threat actors, Description of activities and Motivation

S. No.

Threat Actor

1.

Nation State

2.

3.

Description

Motivation

Hackers directly employed directly
an arm of a national government to
penetrate commercial and/or
government computer systems in
other countries.
Hactivist/Hactivism Individuals or groups who use
digital tools looking to advance their
own social, political and ideological
agendas.

•

Cyber espionage

•

Third Parties

•

Political and/or
social change
Thrill seeking
Reputational
damage
Immediate
financial gain
Collect information
for future financial
gains
Competitive
advantage
Collusion with
other threat actors
Immediate
financial gain
Collect information
for future financial
gains
Personal
advantage,
monetary gains
Malevolent
behaviors
(revenge)
Bribery,
blackmail/coercion/
collusion

Third party vendors and service
providers who:
a. Have access to data
b. Have access to systems
c. Have access to facilities

•
•

•
•
•

4.

5.

Organized Crime

Insiders

Highly structured criminal
organizations and groups of hackers
that seek to attack under-defended
targets and exploit vulnerabilities

•

Current or former employees who
may be disgruntled or under duress
using internal access and authority
for nefarious purposes

•

•

•
•
•
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In May 2018, there were 450 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation around the world,
generating 393, 836 MW(e) total out of which 195 units (43.3%) were built in the last 30 years
and 319 units (70.8%) were constructed during the last 25 years. Currently there are 439
operational nuclear reactors net installed capacity across 31 countries according to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)
database. These critical facilities use both analog and digital systems to monitor and operate
plant processes, equipment, and store and retrieve information. In addition to physical and
system operational security, cyber security of CDAs and computer instrumentation and control
systems (ICS), networks have become a growing concern to both nuclear operators and nuclear
facility regulators around the world. I&C components such as process control systems (PCS),
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), digital control systems (DCS) that
interconnect plant systems performing safety, security, and emergency preparedness (SSEP)
functions are not isolated from the Internet. This presents an attack vector for cyber threats as
shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 respectively.

Figure 1.1: Highly simplified representation of process control system
Source: Kesler, B. (2011). The Vulnerability of Nuclear Facilities to Cyber Attack. Strategic Insights, Vol. 10, Issue 1,
p.16.
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Figure 1.2: SCADA system in a nuclear facility
Source: NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 2 Draft: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, p.2-6, 2014.
(U.S)

According to the Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I) and J.D. Power 2018 Small Business Cyber
Insurance and Security Spotlight Survey, 10 percent of small businesses surveyed suffered one or more
cyber incidents in the prior year, and average cost of cyber-related losses over the past year was $188,400.
Only about one-third of firms surveyed had cyber insurance, nearly 60 percent of respondents said their
company is very concerned about cyber incidents - and 70 percent think that the risk of being victimized
by a cyber-attack is growing at an alarming rate as shown in Figure 1.3. These attacks are orchestrated by
Nation States and non-state actors like hactivist/hactivism, third-parties, organized crime, professional
criminals, spies, voyeurs, corporate raiders, disgruntled insiders, vandals, script kiddies and cyber
terrorists as shown in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.3: Number of data breaches 2006-2015
Source: Identity Theft Resource Centre: https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime
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Foreign Military
Terrorist
Malicious
Hacktivist
Organised Crime
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Script Kiddies
Malicious Insider
System Failure

IT Management
Inadvertent
IT Vendor Interruption
Negligent Employee
Figure 1.4: The cyber threat landscape
Source: https://emerginrisk.com/our-approach-4/threat-landscape/

Currently, the focus is not on new types of threats, but on existing types that are enhanced. As regards
social engineering attacks, for example, a professionalization of the analysis followed by targeting can be
observed. Perimeter security and cloud security measures are no longer sufficient. Increasingly, endpoint
security is in demand again. It is also advisable to keep an eye on the hardware, as it may serve as target
platform for firmware attacks. The impairment of products and standards continues to be a key issue. If
these impairments affect widely used products and standards and remain undetected for a long time, they
may be disastrous in terms of information security. A good example of this is Heartbleed. Therefore, it is
advisable to reduce products' functionality to the maximum and, as a result, avoid the integration of
potential vulnerabilities in unnecessary modules. It is also recommended not activating sensitive or hardly
used modules by default (secure defaults). System providers using security-relevant products and
standards should have several complementary security layers, including controls, in place. This allows
them to reduce potential effects of such impairments (defense in depth). As a general rule, attacks are
becoming more complex and more difficult to identify. For this reason, identifying misuse by means of
user behavior analytics and adaptive security measures are gaining in importance.
In addition, game-changing events like the increase in the number of advanced persistent threats (APTs)
such as the Taj Mahal framework and Stuxnet, malware, Trojan attacks and ransomware attacks at the
personal, corporate and even state levels. A careful examination of cyber-attacks targeted at NPPs from
1980 to present reveals a pattern of increasing incidence of attack and sophistication. Particularly, 2014
presented multiple computer event that had direct impact or relevance for nuclear. Notable examples
include: Bruce NPP (1990), Sellafield (1991), Ignalina (1991), Kurchatov (1991), Davis-Besse Nuclear
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Power Plant Slammer worm attack on August 20, 2003 which started at the contractor's site and spread to
the corporate plant network shutting down the digital portion of Safety Parameter Display (SPD) systems
and Plant Process Control (PPC) for many hours. Others are: Brown's Ferry (2006), Hatch NPP (2008),
Stuxnet at Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz in June 2010 (Figure 1.5); Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (2011), Shamoon (2011), Areva (2011), RSA hack (2011), Aurora Test (2011), Red October
(2011), Susquehanna NPP (2012), Monju NPP (2014), The Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power malware
attack on December 9, 2014 meant to shut down the NPP, Anthem in 2014; Premera Blue Cross (2015),
Target (2013), Japanese Nuclear Materials (2015), Gundremingen NPP (2016), University of Toyama
(2016), Ukraine NPP (2017), Wolf Creek NPP (2017), U.S and European Union NPPs (2018) Heartbleed
cyber breaches in 2014 resulting in the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) system of the
vendor's remote access computer serving as the attack vector as shown in Figure 1.6. The cyber security
sectoral budget of U.S expended to detect and prevent these losses is even greater and has resulted in
financial losses in the billions of dollars as shown in Figure 1.7, while growing sophistication in attack is
shown in Figure 1.8.

Figure 1.5: Timeline of Stuxnet at Natanz, Iran
Source: Kaspersky Labs, Russia

Figure 1.6: Cyber Incidents at NPPs 1980-2016
Source: Gemalto Inc, U.S
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Figure 1.7: Sectoral budget on Cyber security by U.S.A
Source: U.S Office of Management and Budget

Figure 1.8: Cyber Attack Sophistication
Source:
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Alsoin-2016/cyber-defense-nato-securityrole/EN/index.htm

As a sub-set of nuclear security, the cyber threat landscape is highly dynamic and complex [1], it is a
broad and wide-ranging discipline that interacts with all other areas of security in a nuclear facility. All
disciplines of security complement each other to establish a facility’s security posture, which is defined in
the site security plan (SSP) as shown in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. A failure in any of the disciplines of
security could severely impact the other domains and could place additional burdens on the remaining
aspects of security.

Figure 1.9: Domains of nuclear security
Source: 1. 9IAEA Nuclear Security Series 17: Computer
Security at Nuclear Facilities (Technical Guidance),
p.12, 2011.

Figure 1.10: Nuclear security with safety & safeguards
Source: 1.10https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/activity/201112-08/2011-12-08-22.pdf
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In order to counter this growing threat, this paper examines the current nuclear cyber security landscape
vis-a-vis national and international regulatory frameworks and standards and also studies incidents and
lessons learned with a view toward identifying critical gaps and making appropriate recommendations.
This task was accomplished by adopting an open-source data gathering and analysis approach via
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security and safety guidance documents and by
examining country-specific cyber security standards and practices from five selected nuclear-powered
nations namely: China, Germany, Russian Federation, South Africa and the United States. The scope of
this study is restricted to legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for cyber security in civilian
nuclear fuel cycle facilities, e.g., enrichment or fuel fabrication plants, power plants, reprocessing
facilities, research reactors [2], etc. The justification for the focus on cyber security is that it is one of the
most significant new key elements that have entered the nuclear security lexicon in the last decade,
quickly gaining momentum, prominence and significance due to the growing reliance on digital
equipment [2].
The objective of cyber security is to protect information and property from theft, corruption, or natural
disaster, while allowing the information and property remain accessible and useful to authorized users.
Currently cyber security issues are the most important challenge of Information Technology (IT)
development. As global infrastructure increasingly depends on IT with increasing complexity, its
vulnerability increases. The U.S in other to combat the threat of cyber terrorism and other security threats
from adversaries, it categorizes 13 critical infrastructure sectors under its Federal Critical Infrastructure
Protection Policy: Agriculture, Banking and Finance, Chemicals and hazardous materials, Defense
industrial base, Emergency services, energy, Food, Government, Information and Communication
Technology (ICT), Postal and shipping, Public health and healthcare, Transportation, Drinking water and
water treatment systems. Electric power in particular is the most critical infrastructure upon which other
infrastructure depends. Threats to the power infrastructure include natural disasters, human errors, power
system component failures, ICT system failures, gaming in the markets, intrusion and sabotage.
Cyber security technologies have assisted in prevention, detection and response to cyber-attacks to critical
digital assets (CDAs). Currently, there are a number of cyber security technologies that can be used to
better protect CDAs from cyber-attacks according to Sklyar, 2012. In each of these categories, many
technologies are currently available, while other technologies are still being researched and developed.
Table 1.2 summarizes some of the common cyber security technologies, categorized by the type of
security control they help to implement. Critical infrastructure sectors use all of these types of cyber
security technologies to protect their systems. However, the level of use of technologies varies across
sectors and across entities within sectors.
Table 1.2: Cyber Security Technologies Control Categories and Types [3]

1.

Control Category
Access Controls

2.

System Integrity

3.

Cryptography

4.

Audit and Monitoring

Control Type
Boundary protection: Firewalls, Content
management
Authentication: Biometrics, Smart tokens
Authorization: User rights and privileges
Antivirus software
File integrity checkers
Digital signatures and certificates
Virtual private networks
Intrusion detection systems
Intrusion prevention systems
Security event correlation tools
Computer forensics tools
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5.

Configuration management and
assurance

Policy enforcement applications
Network management
Continuity of operations
Scanners
Patch management

There are a lot of different approaches to implement and manage cyber security measures. On from the
approaches is Open Security Architecture (OSA). The OSA Metamodel depicts the entities and
relationships that are relevant for OSA as shown in Figure 11. OSA can provide benefits to IT service
consumers, IT service suppliers and IT vendors, giving the entire IT community an interest in using and
improving. An open approach means that the patterns and catalogues will benefit the whole community
and can be more quickly improved and refined by the common experience of participants.

Figure 1.11: Open security architecture (OSA) Metamodel
Source: www.opensecurityarchitecture.org

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of related works in
computer/information security and nuclear cyber security. Section 3 deals with nuclear cyber security
model frameworks and standards. Section 4 highlight current status and examples of digital I&C systems
in nuclear power plants. Section 5 deals with cyber security regulatory requirements for nuclear facilities.
Section 6 outlines global best practice recommendations on nuclear cyber security for Regulators. Section
7 highlights the implications of cyber security incidents for research and practices. Section 8 points out
the various lessons learned and section 9 is the summary and conclusion respectively.

II.

Related Works

According to Tanenbaum and van Steen (2002), before one can evaluate attacks against a system and
decide on appropriate mechanisms to fend off these threats, it is necessary to specify a security policy. A
security policy defines the desired properties for each part of a secure computer system. It is a decision
that has to take into account the value of the assets that should be protected, the expected threats and the
cost of proper protection mechanisms. A security policy that is sufficient for the data of a normal home
user may not be sufficient for a bank, as a bank is obviously a more likely target and has to protect more
valuable resources. In general, there is a flow of data from a source (e.g., a host, a file, memory) to a
destination (e.g., a remote host, another file, or a user) over a communication channel (e.g., a wire, a data
bus). The task of the security system is to restrict access to this information to only those parties (persons
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or processes) that are authorized to have access, according to the security policy in use. Although
literature uses different approaches to categorizing network attacks, in this paper, I will classify them into
three (3) groups related to confidentiality, integrity and availability, known as the C.I.A triad of network
security goals as shown in Figure 2.1. Confidentiality in the nuclear context implies that unauthorized
logic changes must be prevented; integrity implies that field device inputs and outputs must remain
immutable throughout their usable lifetime and availability means that all components should remain in
an operable state. The U.S.NRC RG 5.71 developed best practices over the years that include the basic
tenet that information security is a life-cycle process. Figure 2.2 shows the U.S.NRC nuclear cyber
security life cycle model and Figure 2.3 depicts the critical digital asset (CDA) identification process
respectively.

Security Attacks

Snooping

Modification

DoS/DDoS

Traffic Analysis

Masquerading

Threat to availability

Threat to Confidentiality

Replacing

Repudiation
Threat to Integrity
Figure 2.1: Classification of computer security attacks with relation to security goals
Source: Forouzan, B. (2003), p.733.

Figure 2.2: Cyber Security Life Cycle
Source: U.S.NRC RG 5.71, p.14

Figure 2.3: CDA Identification process
Source: U.S.NRC RG 5.71, p.16.

For over 30 years, research in computer security has been ongoing. Notable intellectual successes include
cryptographic protocols [4], the star-property [5], multilevel security using information flow [6, 7],
subject-object access matrix model [8], public-key cryptography [9], and access control lists [10]. In spite
of these successes, it seems fair to say that the security of billions of deployed computer systems around
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the world is suspect. Taxonomy defines what data are to be recorded and how like and unlike samplings
are to be distinguished [11]. The C.I.A triad - Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability security goals can
be threatened by security attacks. The snag is the lack of consensus on the approach to adopt in
categorizing the attacks. Previous work has been done in the area of classifying threats and
vulnerabilities.
Early taxonomies such as (Bishop, 1995) [12], focused on categorizing security vulnerabilities in software
to assist security practitioners in maintaining more robust and secure systems through an understanding of
these vulnerabilities. One approach to gaining insight into an attacker's target is to consider the attack
paths, or combination of exploits [13]. John Howard extended this idea in his 1997 doctoral work in
which he analyzed and classified 4,299 security related incidents on the internet. Howard’s work was
notable because he included attackers, results and objectives as classification categories expanding threat
taxonomies beyond the technical details of an attack to include more intangible factors such as an
attacker’s motivation for conducting an attack [14]. The vast majority of threat taxonomies are designed
as attacker-centric frameworks which categorize attacks from the perspective of an attacker’s tools,
motivations and objectives. Killouri, Maxion and Tan created taxonomy in 2004 designed to be defensecentric based on how an attack manifested itself in the target systems. Based on a test set of 25 attacks,
this taxonomy was able to predict whether or not the defender’s detection systems would be able to detect
a given type of an attack [15].
In a similar effort, Mirkovic and Reiher created taxonomy of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
defenses, which categorized DDoS defense mechanisms based on activity level, degree of co-operation
and deployment location [16]. These two taxonomies are among the few that classify threats or security
incidents from a defensive viewpoint and show the importance of addressing such issues from different
perspectives to gain a more holistic view of security issues. Researchers at the University of Memphis led
by Simmons created a cyber-attack taxonomy called AVOIDIT in 2009, which described attacks using
five (5), extensible classifications: Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Informational Impact,
and Target [17]. In recent years, a number of researchers have begun to look at creating taxonomies
specifically addressing SCADA systems. In 2010 Fovino, Coletta & Masera created a comprehensive
taxonomy describing SCADA architecture, vulnerabilities, attacks and countermeasures [18]. In 2011
Zhu, Joseph, & Sastry highlighted the difference between what they termed standard information
technology (IT) systems versus SCADA systems and focused on systematically identifying and
classifying attacks against SCADA systems [19].
The efforts present certain challenge: although they provide background information related to cyber
threats that could be utilized to address future developments, the taxonomies in question do not properly
capture the protection of nuclear facilities in the light of existing cyber threats and legal and regulatory
frameworks. This is because nuclear digital systems are in nature different from general information and
telecommunication systems. Because cyber-attacks against nuclear power plants can result in grievous
consequences in the forms of human, environmental and infrastructural damages, nuclear digital systems
are long-term, real-time systems that demands simultaneous responses to intrusions 24 hours a day, seven
days a week for the entirety of their 30 to 40 years lifespan.
In 2015, Gluschke et. al. (2015) [2] characterized country-specific nuclear cyber regulatory practices and
introduced a potential model for developing a national approach to cyber security at nuclear facilities.
Similarly, in 2016 Dine, Assante, & Stoutland (2016) [20] highlighted the vulnerabilities of IT and ICS
systems in nuclear facilities around the world, comparing country-specific nuclear cyber regulatory
frameworks and best practices. Nuclear systems demand a comprehensive security measure that considers
system life cycle, work processes and procedures as well as infrastructural protection spanning measures
for system developers, system maintenance staffs, third-party contractors, consultants and workers within
the plant. In [30], Gluschke, Mesut & Macori (2018) three levels of cyber threats protection are
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established as requirements: the internet network, the intra-network, and the independently blocked
network. Staff within the plant can work only within the intra-network. The internet and intra-network
must be separated (air gap) to ensure full independence of the workspace and access. Internet access
within the workspace must be authorized and separated from the intranet network. Although this
separation can result in some inefficiencies and inconveniences, it provides an additional layer of security
for the system to protect against cyber threats. The intra-network - must be connected with the
independently blocked network, which controls specific nuclear infrastructure and critical information
systems such as the nuclear reactors, computer systems, the centralized database management systems,
the operating systems, turbine control systems, etc. This independently blocked network - transfers only
simple operation information to the intra - network in order to ensure that new threats such as nuclear
cyber terrorism and espionages are mitigated. In addition, a holistic approach that establishes legal and
institutional frameworks for efficient radiation disaster management systems - must be in place to provide
standards and procedures for regulating and controlling illegal transfer of radioactive and nuclear
materials and for handling sabotage by cyber attackers.
In Cyber security at Nuclear Facilities: National Approaches, a research conducted by the Institute for
Strategic Studies (ISS) at the Brandenburg University of Applied Sciences, Germany and United States
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), they focused on the legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for
cyber security by examining in detail range of measures that affect the higher levels of the hierarchy of
responsibilities [2]. The study’s comparative analysis focuses on national legislation, regulatory
frameworks, regulations and guidance, licensing and other associated regulatory activities. However, the
limitation of their study is their decision not to discuss on the more operational and technical aspects of
cyber security and their implementation at the facility level. The following figure shows the various tiers
of cyber security needed to address the cyber threat at nuclear facilities and indicates the tiers at the nation
state level, which is the focus of this study. The NSS20 approach is broader than is needed for cyber
security; but most essential elements can play a role when assessing a nation state in terms of nuclearcyber readiness, such as ‘Identification and Definition of Nuclear Security Responsibilities’, ‘Legislative,
Regulatory Framework’ or ‘Identification and Assessment of Nuclear Security Threats’ [2]. Figure 2.4
illustrate the defense-in-depth (DID) model for nuclear cyber security.

A.

National legislation

At the highest level, legislation should ideally reflect a contemporary approach to nuclear security,
incorporating concepts expressed in the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [2, 21], as well as including or referring to the security of information (or
more explicitly cyber security) as one of the key elements of nuclear security. In this context it is
probably more feasible to do so in those national legislations where nuclear security is separate from
generic nuclear laws dealing with the promotion and regulation at large of any activity involving
radioactive materials or nuclear energy generation [2]. Countries with or without specific nuclear security
legislation are shown in table 2.1, while those with cyber legislation are shown in Table 2.2.
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Legislation
Regulatory Framework

Nation State's Level

Licensing Process
Quality Assurance Program
Training and Qualification
Good Operating & Maintenance Practices
Intrusion Detection Systems
Approved Procedures
Security Systems
Physical Barriers

Facility Level
Figure 2.4: Defense-in-depth model for cyber security in the nuclear context, Source: [2]
Table 2.1: Specificity of nuclear security legislation [2]

Characteristics
No nuclear law
A generic "nuclear law" dealing broadly with issues relating to the
implementation of nuclear power with few or no explicit references to
nuclear security
A generic "nuclear law" with explicit references or detailed sections
dedicated to nuclear security
A law specifically dedicated to nuclear security (the latter often in
conjunction with more generic "nuclear laws" within the same legal
system)

Countries
China
South Africa [22]

U.S.A [23], Germany [24]
Russia [25, 26]

Table 2.2: Countries with Cyber security legislation [2]

Characteristics
No legislation regarding cyber security is in place
Legislation on cyber security is in place, no explicit provisions for
critical infrastructure or nuclear facilities
Legislation on cyber security is in place, and either has dedicated
sections for critical infrastructure or nuclear facilities or separate
laws covering the cyber security of these exist

Countries
U.S.A., China
South Africa [27, 28]
Russia [29], Germany [30]
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B.

Regulatory framework

Similarly, legislation should operate at the proper level and avoid rapid obsolescence by steering clear of
legislating specific details which are bound to evolve rapidly (like technology) and should instead focus
on establishing the framework for the correct operation of a regulatory authority, with regard to its ability
to write and enforce regulation and to criminalize and prosecute relevant crimes [2]. Table 2.3 shows
countries with or without competent authorities for cybersecurity at their respective nuclear facilities.
Table 2.3: Competent Authority for Cyber Security at Nuclear Facilities [2]

Characteristics
No competent authority explicitly regulating cyber security at
nuclear facilities has been established
Cyber security at nuclear facilities is the responsibility of the
nuclear regulatory body
Cyber security at nuclear facilities is the responsibility of the
cyber regulatory body

C.

Countries
China
Germany, U.S.A, South Africa
Russia

Regulations and guidance

Regulations instead, are standards adopted as rules by the relevant authority to implement, interpret, or
make specific the laws enforced or administered by the authority itself. They are needed so that the
industry may have clear and detailed instructions. At the same time, regulation can evolve and adapt more
rapidly than legislation given a lighter approval/modification procedure that involves fewer stakeholders.
A number of countries - for example, China and South Africa - have regulations pertaining to aspects of
nuclear safety and cyber security that protect national infrastructure in general. There are no specific
regulations in these countries related to the cyber security of nuclear facilities. Also, the status of the
implementation of these regulations is elusive and can therefore not be said to be fully developed. The
United States, Russia and Germany have written regulations in the cyber security of nuclear plants and
the regulations are developed. [31]

D.

Licensing

Ideally cyber security should be embedded into the design of nuclear facilities themselves and their
associated security plans from the beginning. The crucial instruments to ensure that this occurs and is
maintained through the lifecycle of an NPP – as a design goal and as an element of safety and security
culture – are the licensing process and its enforcement [2]. In Germany and the United States
considerations for cyber security are explicitly detailed in the licensing process and in the certification
process of individual systems.

E.

Associated regulatory activities

From supply chain control, to personnel security, to law enforcement training, many different issues may
have a strong impact on the cyber security of nuclear facilities. Regulatory activities for nuclear facilities
should encompass and characterize how threat assessment is done, how cyber security training is
integrated in the programme, whether the nuclear supply chain is regulated, and whether cyber security is
a component of those regulations. It is noteworthy that the United States and South Africa are nations
that involve national intelligence agencies in the preparation of threat information and that this
information is made available directly to nuclear facilities using the Design Basis Threat (DBT) model to
communicate threats to facilities.

F.

Cyber Security Education

Countries with very strong structure for nuclear facilities such as China and Russia, offer national level
education and degree programmes in nuclear security. The majority of the countries delving into nuclear
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facilities usage have educational programmes in cyber security, offered through universities. For example,
Departments of Cyber Security now exist in Nigerian Universities. Although these programmes are new,
often in their beginning stages, and the curriculum does not have contents that addresses nuclear cyber
security. Russia, as of today, is one country where a national educational program for nuclear information
technology (IT) and/or cyber security exists. Centers of higher education focused on cyber security or
nuclear security can provide research, fundamental to advancing the field, as well as a highly trained
workforce, which is necessary to ensure the adequate level of competence in the facilities [2].

III. Analysis of Model Frameworks and Standards
This section provides detailed overview of cyber security Standards, Frameworks and Requirement
specifications for addressing security vulnerabilities in IT/ICS systems used in NPPs. Cyber security
Standards are set of specifications for the cyber security of I&C systems used in NPPs. A Framework is a
risk-based approach to reducing cyber security risk. It comprises of three (3) parts: the Framework Core,
the Framework Implementation Tiers and the Framework Profile [32] as shown in Figure 3.1.

Cyber Security Framework

The Core

Implementation Tiers

Profile

Figure 3.1: Cyber security Framework structure

The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities and references that are common across critical
infrastructure sectors and are organized around particular outcomes. It comprises of four (4) types of
elements: Functions, Categories, Sub-categories, and Informative References. The Framework
Implementation Tier is a lens through which to view the characteristics of an organization's approach to
risk - how an organization views cyber security risk and the processes in place to manage that risk. The
Framework Profile is a representation of the outcomes that a particular system or organization has
selected from the Framework Categories and Sub-Categories [32].
In other to address the security vulnerabilities arising from cybersecurity threats, several frameworks have
been developed by industry standardization organizations, International and national nuclear regulatory
agencies like: the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), National Institutes of Standards and Technology
(NIST), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.NRC), Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
(CNSC), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) etc. These frameworks are vital tools that can be
leveraged to systematically address cyber security concerns in the nuclear sector.
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Nuclear Sector has a long history of
addressing cyber security issues. In 1997, through the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the industry began
looking at potential issues associated with the increasing use of digital technologies at power reactors. At
this time there was a concern regarding the potential impacts associated with the change in millennia—
referred to at that time as the “Y2K” issue. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
industry turned its focus to potential cyber security-related issues. In January 2002, NEI established a
Cyber Security Task Force (CSTF), initially composed of 23 members, to provide an industry-wide forum
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for identifying, discussing, and resolving cyber security issues. In March 2002, the NRC issued Interim
Compensatory Measures (ICM) Orders that directed licensees to consider and address cyber safety and
security vulnerabilities [32].
During 2003 and 2004, the industry was engaged in the development of guidance documents intended to
support the uniform implementation of cyber security programs at power reactors. In July 2003, cyber
security assessment pilots were completed at four U.S. nuclear power reactors. These pilots were
designed to inform development of NUREG/CR-6847, “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S.
Nuclear Power Plants.” The project team consisted of representatives from the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), the NRC, and the CSTF. NUREG/CR-6847 was released in November 2004. In
November 2005, NEI released NEI 04-04, “Cyber Security Program for Power Reactors,” Revision 1.
NEI 04-04 provides guidance on establishing and maintaining a cyber security program and incorporates
assessment methodology described in NUREG/CR-6847.
The NEI 04-04 program provides for the cyber security protection of all systems in the plant including
those necessary for reliable electrical generation. The guidance provides a risk-informed approach, where
consequences to plant functions are considered, and provides guidance on establishing a site cyber
security defensive strategy incorporating multiple defensive layers with increasing levels of security
protection. NEI 04-04 also provides guidance on incorporating cyber security considerations into the
procurement process. The NEI 04-04 program includes the following steps [32]:
• Define current cyber security program
• Identify Critical Digital Assets (CDAs)
• Validate configuration
• Assess susceptibility
• Assess consequences
• Determine risk
• Refine defensive strategy
• Continue program management.
In December 2005, the NRC informed NEI by letter that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-04, “Cyber
Security Program for Power Reactors,” Revision 1, dated November 18, 2005, is an acceptable method
for establishing and maintaining a cyber security program at nuclear power plants. In 2006, the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) acknowledged that the NEI 04-04 program provides
cyber security protection equivalent to the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability
Standards [32].
The nuclear industry established a Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee (NSIAC) that has the
ability to establish initiatives binding to all nuclear power plants. The NSIAC is comprised of the Chief
Nuclear Officers of each power plant site or fleet. Approved NSIAC initiatives are implemented at all
U.S. nuclear power plants. In April 2006, the NSIAC established an initiative requiring nuclear power
plants to implement NEI 04-04 within two years. All U.S. plants implemented the initiative by May 2008
[32].
Power plants are required by the NRC to design, implement, and evaluate their physical and cyber
security programs to defend against a Design Basis Threat (DBT). In response to the increasing threat of
cyber-related attacks, the NRC amended its design basis threat requirements in 2007 to include a cyberattack as an attribute of the adversary. The NRC describes a cyber-attack as:
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“The capability to exploit site computer and communications system vulnerabilities
to modify or destroy data and programming code, deny access to systems, and
prevent the operation of the computer system and the equipment it controls.”
In March 2009, the NRC issued revised security requirements that included comprehensive programmatic
cyber security requirements, principally codified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
Section 10 CFR 73.54, “Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks”
(Rule). The Rule requires power plants to submit a cyber security plan and implementation schedule for
NRC review and approval. To support uniform implementation, the industry developed a template for the
cyber security plan and the implementation schedule. In May 2010 the NRC endorsed NEI 08-09, “Cyber
Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors,” Revision 6. NEI 08-09 provides a template for cyber security
plans and a catalog of technical, operational, and management cyber security controls tailored from the
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information
Systems,” Revision 2. The template for the implementation schedule provides eight milestones—seven
interim milestones and an eighth milestone for full implementation. The first seven milestones are
designed to address the most prominent threats to the plant’s most important systems [32].
These milestones include the establishment of a cyber security assessment team, hardware-based isolation
of key networks and assets, tightening controls over portable media and equipment, enhancing existing
insider threat mitigation, instituting protective measures for digital equipment that could impact key
safety systems, and establishing ongoing monitoring and assessment activities for implemented cyber
security measures. By December 31, 2012, each plant completed the initial seven milestones. Post-2012
activities (the eighth milestone) include the completion of policy and procedural revisions that enhance
existing capabilities, the completion of any remaining design-related modifications necessary to
implement the cyber security plan, and institution of protective measures for lower consequence assets.
In January 2013, the NRC began inspecting power plant cyber security program implementation of the
initial seven milestones, and completed inspections at each power plant at the end of 2015 [32].
The frameworks for providing cyber security controls at NPPs can be categorized into two (2) broad
classes: International and Country-specific. These international publications are consistent with, and
complement, international nuclear security instruments, such as the amended Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material CPPNM), the Code of Conduct (CoC) on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources, United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1373 and 1540, and the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).
The structure of the legal framework as shown in Figure 3.2, which forms the basis for regulation, have
Law, Act, decree and Statute as the principal legislation established by the national legislative body. It
establishes the fundamental structures and concepts, sets infrastructure for regulatory control and defines
out the scope of the legislation. Regulations are more specific in relation to nuclear Cybersecurity, are
developed by the Regulatory Body, are issued by the legislative body, Ministry or Regulatory Body
(varies depending on the national legal system). Licenses are authorizations issued by Regulatory Bodies
as clearance to operate showing compliance with regulatory requirements as regards Cybersecurity.
Regulatory documents include Codes of Practices (CoPs), Guidance documents et cetera. They are
usually developed and issued by the Regulatory Body, give practice specific advice on how to achieve
protection and safety requirements defined in legislation or regulations; may or may not be legally
binding - other procedures might be followed to achieve the same protection and safety goals.
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Figure 3.2: IAEA hierarchy of normative instruments for nuclear safety and security
Source: IAEA NSS No.17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (Technical Guidance), p.9, 2011.

The international frameworks and Standards like IAEA publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series
(NSS) and Basic Safety Standards (BSS) are issued in the following categories as shown in Figure 3.3:
• Nuclear Security Fundamentals: contain objectives, concepts and principles of nuclear security
and provide the basis for security recommendations.
• Recommendations present best practices that should be adopted by Member States in the
application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals.
• Implementing Guides provide further elaboration of the Recommendations in broad areas and
suggest measures for their implementation.
• Technical Guidance: publications include: Reference Manuals, with detailed measures and/or
guidance on how to apply the Implementing Guides in specific fields or activities; Training
Guides, covering the syllabus and/or manuals for IAEA training courses in the area of nuclear
security; and Service Guides, which provide guidance on the conduct and scope of IAEA nuclear
security advisory missions.
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Figure 3.3: IAEA Safety Standard Series hierarchy
Source: IAEA NSS No.17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (Technical Guidance), p.9, 2011.

The selection of a framework should be informed by baseline assessment, risk appetite and governance
model. The primary consideration to be made by those with accountability for cyber security of nuclear
facilities is ensuring that when implementing a framework, linkages and integration are created with the
governance model, risk appetite, strategic plan and the broader enterprise risk management functions. It is
also important to consider the broader regulatory framework and environment to inform framework
selection. These nuclear cyber security frameworks are categorized into IAEA and country-specific
frameworks. The lists of nuclear cyber security frameworks, requirements, guidance are provided in
Tables 3.1-3.3, while Table 3.4 highlights the comparative analysis of the main requirements of IAEA
Draft, U.S NRC RG 5.71 and IEC 62645 CDI.
Table 3.1: IAEA Nuclear Computer/Cyber Security Requirement Sources

.
1

2.

Title of Publication
IAEA Nuclear Security Series Number
20 (NSS 20): Objective and Essential
Elements of a State's Nuclear Security
Regime, 2013.

Type
Fundamentals

IAEA NSS 13: Nuclear Security
Recommendations on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev
5), 2005.

Recommendation

Summary
Provide for the
establishment of
regulations and
requirements for protecting
the confidentiality of
sensitive information and
sensitive information
assets.
Provides a set of
recommended
requirements to achieve the
four Physical Protection
Objectives and to apply the
12
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3.

IAEA NSS No. 17: Computer Security
at Nuclear Facilities, 2011.

Technical Guidance

4.

IAEA NSS No. 23-G: Security of
Nuclear Information

Technical Guidance

5.

IAEA Defense in Depth in Nuclear
Safety (INSAG 10), 1996.

Implementing
Guide

6.

IAEA NSS No. 33-T: Computer Security Technical Guidance
of Instrumentation and Control Systems
at Nuclear Facilities, 2018.

Fundamental Principles.
Section 4.10 states:
"Computer-based systems
used for - physical
protection, nuclear safety,
and nuclear material
accountancy and control
should be protected against
compromise (e.g. cyberattack, manipulation or
falsification) consistent
with the threat assessment
or DBT."
Provide guidelines to
personnel designing,
implementing, and
managing I&C and
information systems (IS)
and networks at nuclear
facilities. It addresses
prevention and detection of
potential attacks through
reference to best practices
in architecture, assurance
and management of
security information and
I&C systems.
Provides guidance on
implementing the principle
of confidentiality and on
the broader aspects of
information security (i.e.
integrity and availability).
It specifically seeks to
assist Member States in the
identification,
classification, and
assignment of appropriate
security controls to
information that could
adversely impact nuclear
security if compromised.
Provide NPPs with DID
implementing guidelines.
Outlines five (5) levels of
DID that should be
sustained at NPPs.
Provides guidance for the
protection of I&C systems
at nuclear facilities on
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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

computer security against
malicious acts that could
prevent such systems from
performing their SSEP
functions. Its scope
includes application of
computer security
measures to I&C systems,
application of such
measures to the
development, simulation
and maintenance
environments of these
systems.
IAEA Computer Security for Nuclear
Implementing
Provide guidance on
Security (NST045), 2016.
Guide
developing, implementing
(Under
and integrating computer
development)
security as key component
of nuclear security.
Applies to the computer
security aspects of nuclear
security regime.
IAEA Computer Security Techniques for Technical Guidance Provides discussion on
Nuclear Facilities (NST047).
Under development) good practices for
implementing computer
security associated digital
technologies at nuclear
facilities.
IAEA Computer Security of I&C
Technical Guidance Provides guidance on
Systems at Nuclear Facilities (NST036),
implementing computer
2016.
security controls across the
life cycle of nuclear I&C
and control systems.
IAEA Conducting Computer Security
TECDOC Series
Provides good practices for
Assessments (NST037), 2015.
organizing and conducting
computer security
assessments associated
with nuclear security.
IAEA Computer Security Incident
TECDOC Series
Provides good practices for
Response (NST038), 2015.
implementing computer
security incident response
processes between
competent authorities,
operators, and technical
support organizations.
IAEA Computer Security during the
Technical Guidance Provide guidance to States,
Lifetime of a Nuclear Facility (NST051),
competent Authorities and
2016.
operators on appropriate
nuclear security measures
during the different stages
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in the lifetime of a nuclear
facility. Covers nuclear
safety, security and
safeguards.
Table 3.2: International Standards Organizations Cyber Security Requirement Sources

.

Title of Publication
IEEE 7-4.3.2-2016: Standard Criteria for
Programmable Digital Devices in Safety
Systems of Nuclear Power Generating
Stations, 2016.

Type
Standard

2.

IEEE 1686-2013: Standard for
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
Cyber Security Capabilities, 2008.

Reference

3.

IEC 61513: Nuclear Power Plant Implementation and Control Important
to Safety General Requirements for
Systems, 2011.

Standard

4.

ISO/IEC TR 13335-1: Information
Technology - Guidelines for the
Management of Information Technology
Security, 2001.

Standard

1.

Summary
This standard serves to amplify
criteria to IEEE Std 603(TM)-2009,
to address the use of programmable
digital devices as part of safety
systems in nuclear power generating
stations. The criteria contained
herein, in conjunction with criteria in
IEEE Std 603-2009, establish
minimum functional and design
requirements for programmable
digital devices used as components
of safety systems.
The standard defines functions and
features to be provided in intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) to
accommodate cybersecurity
programs. It addresses security
regarding the access, operation,
configuration, firmware revision and
data retrieval from an IED.
Confidentiality, integrity and
availability of external interface of
the IED is also addressed.
Provides requirements and
recommendations for the overall
I&C architecture which may contain
either or both technologies. The
main technical changes are
alignment with the latest revisions of
IAEA documents, alignment with
the new editions of IEC 60880, IEC
61226, IEC 62138, IEC 62340, IEC
60987, alignment with significant
advances of software engineering
techniques and integration of
requirements for staff training.
Provide a standard for IT security.
Consists of Five (5) parts: Concepts
& models for managing & planning
IT Security, Techniques for the
Management of IT Security,
Selection of safeguards &
Management guidance on Network
Security.
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5.

ISO/IEC 27000:2009
ISO/IEC 27001:2005
ISO/IEC 27002:2005
ISO/IEC 27005:2008
ISO/IEC 27006:2007

Standard

Developed from BS7799 published
in the mid-1990. The British
Standard accepted by ISO/IEC as
ISO/IEC 17799:2000 revised in 2005
and re-numbered in 2007 to align
with other ISO/IEC 2700 series
standards. It provides best practice
recommendation on information
security management for use by
those with accountabilities for
initiating, designing, maintaining
information security management
systems.

Table 3.3: Country-Specific Cyber Security Requirement Sources

.

Title of Publication
NIST Special Publication
800-82 Rev 2: Guide to
Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) Security, 2014.

Country
Type
U.S
Standard

2.

NIST Special Publication
800-30: Risk Management
Guide for Information
Technology Systems, 2002.

U.S

Reference

3.

NIST Special Publication SP
800-53A Rev 1: Guide for
Assessing the Security
Controls in Federal
Information Systems in
Organizations, 2008.

U.S

Reference

4.

NIST Special Publication
800-53 Rev 3: Recommended
Security Controls for Federal
Information Systems and
Organizations, 2009.

U.S

Reference

5.

NIST FIPS PUB 140-2:
Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules,
2002.

U.S

Reference

1.

Summary
Provide guidance for securing ICS,
including SCADA, DCS and other
systems performing control
functions. Outlines notional
overview of ICS, reviews typical
system topologies and architectures,
identifies known threats and
vulnerabilities to these systems etc.
Provide guidance for conducting
risk assessments of Federal
Information Systems and
organizations, simplifying the
guidance in SP 800-39. It satisfies
the requirement of FISMA.
Provides guidelines for developing
security assessment plans and
associated security control
assessment procedures that are
consistent with SP 800-53, Revision
3 in all phases of the development
life cycle.
This standard supersedes NIST SP
800-53A Rev 1. It provides a set of
security controls that can satisfy the
breadth and depth of security
requirements levied on information
systems and organizations and that
is consistent with and
complementary to other established
information security standards.
Is a Computer Security Standard
used to approve cryptographic
modules that include both software
and hardware components? An
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6.

NEI 04-04 Rev 1/NEI 08-09
Rev 6: Cyber Security
Program for Power Reactors,
2005/2010

U.S.

7.

NEI 10-04 Rev 2: Identifying
Systems and Assets Subject
to the Cyber Security Rules,
2012.

U.S.

8.

Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (N.R.C)
Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71:
Cyber Security Programs for
Nuclear Facilities, 2010.

U.S.

9.

N.R.C Regulatory Guide
(RG) 73.54: Protection of
Digital Computer and
Communication Systems and
Networks

U.S.

10.

N.R.C Regulatory Guide 5.83
(RG 5.83): Cyber Security
Event Notifications, 2015.

U.S

initial publication was on May 25,
2001 and was last updated
December 3, 2002.
Rule
Provides a template for nuclear
power reactor licensees with a
means for developing and
maintaining a cyber security
program at their sites. The plan
includes a defensive strategy that
consists of a defensive architecture
and a set of security controls that are
based on NIST SP 800-82, Final
Public Draft, Dated September 29,
2008, "Guide to ICS," and NIST SP
800-53, Revision 2, Recommended.
Rule
Provide guidance on the
identification of digital computer
and communication systems &
networks subject to the requirements
of 10 CFR 73.54. Utilizes the
licensee's Current Licensing Basis
(CLB) to ascertain important-tosafety functions in the context of the
NRC Cyber Security Rule.
Regulatory Provides comprehensive guidance to
Guide
applicants and licensees on
satisfying the requirements of 10
CFR 73.54 that the OMB approved
under OMB control number 3150002 by using NIST SP 800-53, Rev
3 framework.
Reference Performance-based programmatic
requirement that ensures that the
functions of digital computers,
communication systems, and
networks associated with SSEP
functions are protected from cyberattacks. Licensees provide high
assurance that digital computer and
communication systems and
networks are adequately protected
against cyber-attacks, up to and
including the design-basis threat
(DBT), as described in 10 CFR
73.1, "Purpose and Scope".
Rule
Addresses cyber security event
notification requirements. Describes
approaches and methodologies that
staff of the U.S. N.R.C considers
acceptable for use by NPP licensees
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11.

N.R.C Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.152 Rev 2 & 3:
Criteria for Use of Computer
in Safety Systems of Nuclear
Power Plants, 2006. (U.S.)
Template for the Cyber
Security Plan Implementation
Schedule

U.S

Rule

U.S

Rule

13.

Department of Homeland
Security (D.H.S) Catalog of
Control Systems Security:
Recommendations for
Standards Developers, 2009.

U.S

14.

D.H.S Cyber Security
Procurement Language for
Control Systems, Version 1.8,
2008.

U.S

15.

D.H.S Cyber Security
Assessments of Industrial
Control System, 2017.

U.S

16.

D.H.S Recommended
Practice for Patch
Management of Control
Systems, 2008

U.S

17.

D.H.S Recommended
Practice: Improving Industrial
Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defensein-Depth (DID) Strategies

U.S

18.

Regulatory Document
(REGDOC) - 2.5.1: Design of
Reactor Facilities - Nuclear
Power Plants, 2014.

Canada

12.

when categorizing certain cyber
security event, and the process for
conducting notifications and
submitting written security followup reports to the NRC for cyber
security events.
Provided specific guidance to
nuclear power plant licensees for
use in the design, development and
implementation of IT/ICS systems.

Provides a template used by each
operating power plant to establish
the schedule for the implementation
of their cyber security plans.
Reference The catalog presents a compilation
of practices that various industry
bodies have recommended to
increase the security of control
systems from both physical and
cyber-attacks.
Reference Summarize security principles that
should be considered when
designing and procuring control
systems products (software,
systems, and networks) and provide
example language to incorporate
into procurement specifications.
Reference Covers the process of planning an
ICS cyber security assessment,
including how to select testing areas
and reporting process.
Reference The report recommends patch
management practices for
consideration and deployment by
ICS asset owners. It specifically
identifies issues and recommends
practices for ICS patch management
in order to strengthen overall ICS
security.
Reference The report provides guidance for
developing defense-in-depth
strategies for organizations that use
control systems networks while
maintaining multi-tier information
architectures.
Regulatory Provides overall status of Canadian
Guide
regulatory framework for cyber
security, as well as key requirements
of new CSA standard N290.7-14.
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19.

Korea Institute of Nuclear
Safety Regulatory Guide KINS/RG N08.22: Cyber
Security for I&C System,
2009. (South Korea)

Cyber Security aspects of
Computer-based I&C systems.
Republic Regulatory Provides a framework for guidance
of Korea Guide
in implementing cyber security
controls at Korean NPPs.

Table 3.4: Comparative analysis of the main requirements of IAEA Draft, U.S NRC RG 5.71 and IEC 62645 CDI [3]

Document Categories

IAEA Draft (66 pages)

Main entity and
definition

Computer security
(synonym of cyber
security) is a particular
aspect of information
security related to
computer-based
systems, networks and
digital systems.
Information security the security of any
information regardless
of the media used to
store or transmit the
information. Includes
the preservation of the
confidentiality,
integrity and
availability attributes of
information; in
addition, other
properties such as
authenticity,
accountability, nonrepudiation and
reliability can also be
involved.
Personnel security,
Technical, Operational
Physical security,
and Management
Nuclear security (in
control
1.2.1, not in Glossary)
Management systems,
Organizational issues,
Implementing computer
security.

Security Control

Related documents

Site Security Plan
Computer Security Plan
(can be a part of
SSP)

U.S NRC RG 5.71
(105 pages)
There is no security
definitions Cyber
security – protection
against cyber-attacks is
meant.

Cyber Security Plan
Cyber Security
Program

IEC 62645 CDI (37
pages)
No security definitions
Computer security reference to IAEA
guidance The goal of
the computer-based
security is to protect the
I&C systems from
deliberate and
intelligent attacks that
may jeopardize overall
plant safety and
availability.

11 security categories
and Security
Programme
management.

Security Programme
Computer Security Plan
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Requirements to
vendors

Life cycle

Levels of Security

It is paramount that the
security department
works closely with the
contracts department to
ensure that the security
provisions are
incorporated in each
contract. When
considered necessary,
checks and audits
should be made to
ensure that the
contracting
organization’s
management system
adequately addresses
security issues, and that
the organization’s
practices and measures
are in compliance with
the system.
Security management
lifecycle (spiral shape)

There are no direct
requirements, only
from utility point of
view

There are no direct
requirements. Platform
and application security
are a part of operational
security procedures.

Security lifecycle
process (spiral shape)

Linear Life Cycle
Implementation of
Computer Security

Five levels of security
(strength of Measures)

Five levels of cyber
security defensive
architecture

Five levels of computer
security protective
measures

IV. Status and Examples of Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear
Power Plants
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) rely on I&C systems for protection, control, supervision and monitoring. A
typical unit has approximately 10 000 sensors and detectors and 5000 km of I&C cables. The total mass
of I&C related components is on the order of 1000 tonnes. This makes I&C system one of the heaviest
and most extensive non-building structures in any nuclear power plant. No globally comprehensive
statistics are available on the numbers of plants with fully analog, fully digital or hybrid I&C systems.
However, approximately 40% of the world’s 439 operating power reactors, accounting for nearly all of
the 30 countries with operating NPPs, have had some level of digital I&C upgrade to, at least, important
safety systems. From another perspective, 90% of all the digital I&C installations that have been done
have been modernization projects at existing reactors. 10% have been at new reactors. Of the 34 reactors
currently under construction around the world, all of those for which construction began after 1990 have
some digital I&C components in their control and safety systems.
In Japan, the first fully digital I&C system was integrated into the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-6 advanced
boiling water reactor (ABWR) in 1996, followed shortly by Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-7 (KK-7). Similar
digital I&C systems are used in Hamaoka-5. Tomari-3, which will feature the first all-digital reactor
control room, is scheduled to begin operation in 2009.
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In China, Qinshan Phase III, with two 700 MW(e) CANDU reactors, and Tianwan-1 and -2, with two
1000 MW(e) VVERs, have fully digital I&C systems, including both the safety and control systems, and
partly computerized, i.e. hybrid, human-system interfaces (HSIs). China’s high-temperature gas cooled
experimental reactor, the HTGR-10, also has fully digital safety and control I&C systems, plus a hybrid
human-system interface in its main control room.
In the UK at Sizewell B, a 1250 MW(e) PWR, all automatic functions of the safety I&C systems are
digital, and in the main control room, all the qualified displays used in the human-system interface are
computerized.
In Russia, Kalinin-3, which was commissioned in 2004, is the first VVER-1000 equipped with digital
I&C safety systems and digital process control systems. In addition, both its main and emergency control
rooms have hybrid human-system interfaces. A dynamic simulator was also installed for the purpose of
testing control functions.
In the Republic of Korea, three 1000 MW(e) PWRs are under construction (Shin-Kori-1 and -2 and ShinWolsong-1), all with fully digital I&C safety and control systems and hybrid human-system interfaces in
the control rooms.
In the USA, 1978 was the last year in which construction started on a reactor that eventually came online.
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has therefore not had the same experience with digital
I&C systems as have regulators in China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, where the expansion of
nuclear power is centred. Partly as a result, digital systems have not yet been approved for use as safety
systems in operating US NPPs. Figure 4.1 is a simplified illustration of a U.S case where the I&C systems
for controlling the plant, on the left side of the figure, are digital (computers, digital data networks,
automatic calculations, and microprocessor-based sensors), and the I&C systems for safety, labelled
“protection” on the right side of the figure, are analog. The figure also illustrates the features of
independence, redundancy, and diversity that are essential in I&C systems and are outlined below.

Figure 4.1: Typical I&C architecture for a plant with a digital I&C system for control and an analog I&C system for
safety (labelled “protection” in the figure).
Source: US National Research Council, Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in NPPs - Safety and Reliability
Issues, 1997).
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V.

Cyber Security Regulatory Requirements for Nuclear
Facilities

All nuclear power plant licensees are required by regulation to establish, implement, and maintain a cyber
security program that provides a high assurance of adequate protection against cyber-attacks. There are
three (3) distinct groups or types of requirements that the cyber security program must satisfy:
•
•
•

Performance Requirements,
Programmatic Requirements and
Documentary Requirements respectively [33].

This perspective provides a distinction between what outcomes are expected versus the necessary
programmatic and documentary articles required to demonstrate the achievement of those outcomes [33].

VI. Global Best Practice Recommendations on Nuclear
Cyber Security for Regulators
Crafting a cyber security regulatory framework is a difficult and complex task for any nuclear regulator.
The following global best practice recommendations, if strictly followed, will help in simplifying the
process of implementing a robust nuclear cyber security defense system:
a) Adopt a risk-based cyber security framework for isolating critical digital assets (CDAs) by
thoroughly analyzing systems and processes to classify their criticality and attack paths.
b) Institutionalize cyber security. The most challenging issue for nuclear cyber security is
configuration integrity. The licensee must be compelled by the regulator to establish and
demonstrate how configuration integrity is maintained in their facility.
c) Set the scope by limiting consequences of radiological hazards.
d) Demand verifiability and accurate system documentation on the digital characteristics of the plant
systems, including details on system and network configuration, data flows, authorized software
applications, engineering systems, etc.
e) Implement an active cyber defense system rather than being reactive to cyber threats.
f) Reduce digital complexity of CDAs as it complicates the task of securing CDAs.
g) Avoid blind adoption of information security concepts. Refer to concepts from safety and control
systems engineering.
h) Get the cyber design basis threat right. Defining a DBT based on hackers and malware attack is
too simplistic. Consider the design of modified products.
i) Implement a cyber incident response strategy. A sophisticated cyber-attack against a nuclear
facility implies the risk of radiological release, thereby creating a hazard to public safety and
compromising national security. Responding to such an event is not the sole responsibility of the
licensees. Just like in the case of physical attacks, have a solid response plan ready and tell the
licensees what you expect from them in terms of first response.

VII. Implications for Research and Practices
Based on the foregoing, the questions that result from the discourse are:
• What effect will an increase in the cost of cyber security/system protection have on nuclear
renaissance?
• What is the overall lesson for nuclear-emerging countries like Nigeria when it comes to
embracing cyber security as an important piece of nuclear power program implementation?
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•

At what point will a break in the link in Cyber Attack Sophistication model become a threat to
safety or security in terms of operation or plant availability? It is necessary to answer these
pertinent questions in order to properly situate the findings from our discourse in line with the
evolution of nuclear facilities in developing countries such as Nigeria.

With regard to the first and second questions the cost benefit analysis of the nuclear renaissance,
with all of its ramifications is skews positively, as the deliverables from nuclear energy provides
many resources that result in earned revenue that can be used to address security issues.
Although cyber security of nuclear facilities will increase the cost of operations, planning
cybersecurity for nuclear facilities should be an integral part of the overall security processes and
strategy. With regard to the third question, looking at the Cyber Attack Sophistication model, it
is pertinent to mention that any form of vulnerability poses a major threat to the safety or
security of nuclear facilities in terms of operation or plant availability.

VIII.

Lessons Learned

The various cyber security incidents reported in this paper and vulnerabilities of I&Cs deployed in NPPs
around the world hold important lessons for the cyber security of nuclear facilities and critical digital
infrastructure in general.
a. The notion of airgap separating control and protection sections of NPPs has been proved wrong.
The case of Davis-Besse NPP shows that this is a misconception. Operators who try to monitor
and protect every connection cannot be sure they know about all of them. Stuxnet was transmitted
via thumb drives to infect computers that were not connected to the internet.
b. Security vulnerabilities as a result of digital I&C deployment across CDAs are more complicated
than earlier thought by alarmists and sceptics.
c. The various cyber security incidents reveal that Process Control Systems (PCSs) are not immune
from attacks since they are different from ordinary computers as widely believed.
d. There is need for an understanding of current cyber security challenges and threat. NPPs
responsible for power generation, enrichment and storage are complex computing environments
consisting of hundreds to thousands of individual devices. These devices and computer systems
that manage them are built from a combination of common, off-the-shell (OTS) computing
technologies and custom, one-of-a-kind hardware, software and networking protocols. The only
commonality between these facilities is that a large number of their critical systems tend to be
built on legacy technologies. The current ad hoc approach to computer security that attempt to
detect and block cyber-attacks using intrusion detection systems (IDS) is attack-centric and needs
to change to a proactive, risk-based approach.
e. Due to dynamic and complex threat landscape confronting computer systems deployed at NPPs, a
new approach to computer security is needed, centered on sound principles and technologies that
can be used to construct effective defenses. The vulnerability-centric security approach seeks to
address the root cause of system insecurity - system vulnerabilities - and creates the opportunity
for security to be more constructive.
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IX. Summary and Conclusion
From this study, only three out of the five countries possess written cyber regulations (U.S.A, Germany
and Russia); China and South Africa do not have these regulations. The diversity in the ways in which
cyber capabilities can be used poses one of the greatest challenges in Information technology. Computer
security must be an essential component in an effective and robust nuclear security regime, so as to guard
against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats in a digitally dependent environment. Nonetheless,
particularly the computers used in safety and safety-related systems must be very well protected from
possible intrusions. But other computers must be protected as well. The computers used to control the
plant are essential to assure the continuity of power production. The computers used to control access to
sensitive areas are needed both to prevent unauthorized access that might be part of an attack, and to
assure authorized access both for safety and security reasons. Computers that store important and
sensitive data have to be protected to assure that those data are not erased or stolen. Possible cyber-attacks
could be associated with business espionage, technology theft, a disgruntled employee, a recreational
hacker, a cyber activist, organized crime, a nation state, or a terrorist organization.
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